Decided on February 18, 2021 I see no persuasive rationale why, if a bicycle and a car are parked next to each other on a driveway, it is reasonable to search the bicycle's closed basket but unreasonable to search the car's trunk. Judges Rivera, Stein and Fahey concur. Two subsequent cases did. In the Nissan, which defendant was borrowing from the owner, the police found heroin, marijuana, cocaine, money, and drug paraphernalia. Citing Rainey, we [*3]reiterated that under our precedent, the "scope of the search has been carefully limited" and "probable cause must be shown in each instance" (id.). . Roadways to the Bench: Who Me? . We first held that the underlying warrant for the residence lacked sufficient factual allegations to authorize a search of the residence (Dumper, 28 NY2d at 298). Likewise, the People attempt to distinguish People v Dumper by arguing that the salient difference in Dumper was that the vehicle was driven onto the property during the execution of the warrant. Additionally, all of those cases either directly rely on federal case law, or rely on New York cases that turned on federal case law, in deciding the search-and-seizure issues before them (see Sciacca, 45 NY2d at 127-129; Hansen, 38 NY2d at 21-23; Dumper, 28 NY2d at 299; Rainey, 14 NY2d at 38). Like Sciacca and Dumper, Hansen focused on the basic tenets of probable cause of criminal activity in the warrants at issue and did not address the question here. But the location of that search was an im-pounded vehiclenot a home"'a constitutional differ-ence'" that the opinion repeatedly stressed. New York v Class, 475 US 106, 109 [1986] [New York Court of Appeals opinion failed to satisfy the plain-statement rule where it mentioned the New York Constitution "but once, and then only in direct conjunction with the United States Constitution," and made "use of both federal and New York cases in its analysis, generally citing both for the same proposition"]; New York v P.J. are best promoted by applying State constitutional standards" (Johnson, 66 NY2d at 407) and when the "constitutional protections we have enjoyed in this State have in fact been diluted by subsequent decisions of a more recent Supreme Court (Scott, 79 NY2d at 504 [Kaye, C.J., concurring]). However, Siegal struck back with a letter to Judge Feuerstein regarding the prosecutor's intentions to pursue criminal action against Drago: In its letter, the Government has asserted that, notwithstanding the suppression of theevidence, it intends to proceed with prosecuting John [Drago]. Although a defendant must preserve a state constitutional analysis, Mr. Gordon has maintained throughout this litigation that the holdings of our jurisprudence should not follow the federal appellate extensions of United States v Ross, and that the rationale and considerations that undergird our jurisprudence counsel against adopting any extension of Ross that might displace them. Defendant's [*7]expectation of privacy in the vehicles is not disputed. Before Supreme Court, the People responded by attempting to distinguish our prior decisions and arguing that, if they were distinguishable and therefore not controlling, Supreme Court should adopt the People's preferred rule interpreting the Fourth Amendment.
