And as I explained above, the school districts have no remedial interest in pursuing these programs. This discrepancy is not some simple and straightforward error that touches only upon the peripheries of the districts use of individual racial classifications. Because equal protection on the basis of race is at issue, the applicable standard of review to be applied in this case is strict scrutiny, as both parties agree, and as is well established in the Courts prior case law. v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265 (1978); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (1986); Richmond v. J. He writes that Justice Breyer misused and misapplied previous Supreme Court precedents in this area and that he greatly exaggerates the consequences of the decision of this case. of Springfield v. Board of Ed., 362 Mass. 1806, 20 U. S.C. 7231 et seq. For instance, a Texas appeals court in 1986 rejected a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to a voluntary integration plan by explaining: [T]he absence of a court order to desegregate does not mean that a school board cannot exceed minimum requirements in order to promote school integration. For Swann is predicated upon a well-established legal view of the Fourteenth Amendment. 1, p.57 ([T]he people of Kansas . In fact, Seattle apparently began to treat these different minority groups alike in response to the federal Emergency School Aid Acts requirement that it do so. For example, where does the dissents principle stop? [Footnote 10]. In keeping with his view that strict scrutiny should not apply, Justice Breyer repeatedly urges deference to local school boards on these issues. Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Stevens, Justice Souter, and Justice Ginsburg join, dissenting. Sixteen years into the plan, 14 of 19 middle and high schools remained almost totally white or almost totally black. PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.SEATTLE SCHOOL DIST. NO. 1 Most non-white families live south of downtown, where five high schoolsChief Sealth, Cleveland, Franklin, Garfield, and Rainier Beachare located. Accepting racial balancing as a compelling state interest would justify imposing racial proportionality throughout American society, contrary to the Courts repeated admonitions that this is unconstitutional. 2d 358, 376377 (WD Ky. 2000), that decree was dissolved in 2000, id., at 360. 2d 1267 (1996). No. See 539 U. S., at 320. For the purpose of this section, racial imbalance shall be deemed to exist when the per cent of nonwhite students in any public school is in excess of fifty per cent of the total number of students in such school. 352 Mass., at 695, 227 N.E. 2d, at 731. De jure? of Ed., 72 F.Supp. to reject the argument that a race-conscious plan is permissible only when there has been a judicial finding of de jure segregation. 610 F.2d, at 663664. The wide variety of different integration plans that school districts use throughout the Nation suggests that the problem of racial segregation in schools, including de facto segregation, is difficult to solve. Post, at 38. 05908, p. 42. The passage Justice Stevens quotes proves our point; all the quoted language says is that the school committee shall prepare a plan to eliminate the imbalance. Id., at 695, 227 N.E. 2d, at 731; see post, at 4, n. 5. Const., Amdt. First, the histories of Louisville and Seattle reveal complex circumstances and a long tradition of conscientious efforts by local school boards to resist racial segregation in public schools.
Wantirna Crime Rate,
Robert Graham Sport Shirts,
Dream Of The Devil In Disguise,
Articles P